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Abstract
Marriage is an event of great social and economic significance in most socie-
ties. Despite the centrality of marriage in an individual’s life history, the literature on
marriage patterns pays little attention to men. This paper examines trends in school-
ing, age, and assets at marriage for both men and women, and spousal differences in
these variables in six countries—Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Mexico, the
Philippines, and South Africa—using comparable data sets and methodologies.
Descriptive statistics show that the correlation between personal characteris-
tics is increasing compared to the correlation between parental characteristics, indi-
cating greater personal choice in marriage. Multivariate results indicate that both
husbands and wives are better educated and older in more recent marriages. Hus-
bands’ assets at marriage increase through time in four countries and remain con-
stant in two. Wives’ assets at marriage increase in three countries, remain constant in
two, and decline in one.
Husband educational advantage at marriage has decreased in three countries,
has not changed in two, and has increased in one. Husband age seniority has de-
creased in four countries and remained constant in two. However, the distribution of
assets at marriage continues to favor husbands. In three of the six countries studied,
the husband–wife asset difference has not changed through time—and therefore con-
tinues to favor husbands—and has increased in the other three.
While the reduction of husband–wife gaps in schooling and age may improve
the balance of power within the family, persistent differences in assets in favor of
husbands may have important effects on family well-being. Lastly, the implications
of increased personal choice and delayed marriage on the institution of marriage
itself deserve further investigation.
Marriage is an event of great social and economic significance in most societies.
It is a rite of passage that marks the beginning of an individual’s separation from the
parental unit, even if generations continue to be socially and economically interdepen-
dent. In many developing countries, it represents the union not only of two individuals,
but also of two families or kinship groups. In many societies, it also entails a substantial
transfer of assets from parents to children.
Assets brought to marriage are more than a form of intergenerational transfer—
they may affect the distribution of bargaining power and resources within the marriage
itself.
Recent work testing the collective versus the unitary model of household behavior
suggests that conditions at the time of marriage may affect the distribution of welfare
within marriage. In particular, it has been shown that the distribution of assets between
spouses at the time of marriage is a possible determinant of bargaining power within mar-
riage (Quisumbing and de la Brière 2000; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2002; Thomas,
Contreras, and Frankenberg 1997, 2002). The value of assets at marriage confers bargain-
ing power because it influences the exit options available to spouses. While assets at mar-
riage may not completely determine the distribution of assets upon divorce (Fafchamps
and Quisumbing 2002), these measures are, in themselves, worth investigating because
they shed light on the institution of marriage and inheritance.
Given the centrality of marriage in an individual’s life history, surprisingly little
has been written regarding trends in marriage patterns. Because the timing of first mar-
riage critically influences subsequent life events for women, most of the analyses have
focused on the female mean singulate age at marriage (e.g., United Nations 1990) and its
determinants. Using data from 40 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in developing
countries, Singh and Samara (1996) found that, while age at marriage is increasing, a
substantial proportion of women in developing countries continue to marry as adoles-
cents. Increases in age at marriage are associated with major social-structural changes
such as increases in educational attainment, urbanization, and the emergence of new roles
for single women. Jejeebhoy (1995) analyzed 51 studies based on a number of data sources,
mostly the World Fertility Surveys and DHS, and found that education is the single factor
most strongly related to the postponement of marriage, but the relationship may be subject
4to threshold effects. In many countries, the tendency for education to raise marriage age
becomes universal only after a few years of primary education. However, because the
results of the few studies available are contradictory, little can be said about trends in the
relationship between education and age at marriage over time (Jejeebhoy 1995, p. 66).
Because research on marriage timing has been largely motivated by a demographic
interest in the initiation of reproduction (Malhotra 1997), and because few fertility sur-
veys collect marriage data for men, most of the studies on age at marriage have been
limited to women’s experiences (Singh and Samara 1996). As Malhotra (1997) argues,
the focus on women neglects the fact that entry into marriage is also an important life
course transition for men, which reflects family structure, gender relations, and social
change. Malhotra’s own work in Indonesia is one of a few recent studies that examine
the determinants of marriage timing for both men and women. Hertrich (2002) docu-
ments trends in marriage age for men and women in Africa. (Earlier studies on timing of
marriage include Dixon [1971] and Smith [1980].)
In addition, the literature on marriage rarely pays attention to the resources that
men and women bring to the union. This is a serious gap as empirical work on
intrahousehold behavior suggests that the distribution of resources at marriage may af-
fect bargaining power within marriage. Part of this gap is due to limitations of the data.
Anthropological studies are detailed and informative, but only for a small set of
people in a particular setting, and very rarely follow the same group through time. How-
ever, anthropological techniques have been innovatively used to study changes in mar-
riage patterns. For example, Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell (1983) combine data col-
lected using quasi-anthropological approaches and small-scale surveys in a rural area of
the south Indian state of Karnataka to examine the changing nature of marriage. Eco-
nomic analyses have focused mainly on transfers at marriage such as brideprice and
dowries (Rao 1993a, 1993b; Zhang and Chan 1999), and not the totality of assets that
spouses bring to marriage. Even if brideprice or dowries have great social and cultural
significance, there is evidence that they account for only a small proportion of assets
brought to marriage in rural Ethiopia (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002), and none at
all in countries that do not practice either. In general, scant quantitative data capture
5both cross-sectional and longitudinal variation with enough detail to describe the sig-
nificance of conditions at marriage in different cultures. Thus, work analyzing marriage
patterns and resources at marriage in a number of countries, using comparable data
collection methodologies and empirical analyses, has been scarce.
This paper analyzes data on husband’s and wife’s human and physical capital and
conditions surrounding marriage collected by the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) in six developing countries.1 Four data sets—from Bangladesh, Ethio-
pia, Guatemala, and South Africa—were collected as part of a larger research program
on gender and development policy at IFPRI (Bouis et al. 1998; Fafchamps and
Quisumbing 2002; Hallman 2000; Hallman et al. 2002; Maluccio, Haddad, and May
2000; Quisumbing and de la Brière 2000; Ruel et al. 2002); the data from Mexico were
collected for the evaluation of PROGRESA (Programa Nacional de Educación, Salud y
Alimentación), a nationwide program that conditions transfer benefits upon child school
and health care attendance (de la Brière and Quisumbing 2000; Skoufias 2001); and the
data from the Philippines were part of an earlier study on gender difference in
intergenerational transfers (Quisumbing 1994).2 The data sets from the six countries
used comparable data collection methodologies, drew from qualitative studies or the
anthropological literature to formulate quantitative survey modules, and contain retro-
spective data on family background and physical and human capital at marriage for both
husbands and wives. The IFPRI study countries were also chosen to capture geographic
and cultural variation, as well as to focus on specific policy issues related to gender.
Assets at marriage are deflated using the appropriate consumer price index so that the
real value of assets from earlier and later marriages can be compared. Unlike those from
the Demographic and Health Surveys, the samples are relatively small and are not na-
tionally representative; the study sites are not, however, outliers relative to living condi-
tions within each country (see Appendix Table 1). Moreover, because the surveys were
not designed to examine demographic variables (e.g., fertility histories or age at mar-
riage), it is possible that these aspects of the data are less reliable than the economic
modules. These caveats must be considered when interpreting some of the regression
results, particularly those on age at marriage.
6We use these data to estimate similar regressions for all countries: (1) regressions
on levels of human capital (education), age at marriage, and assets at marriage (consid-
ered separately for husband and wife) as a function of the parental background of each
spouse; the population sex ratio (ratio of females to males of mean sample marriageable
age, an indicator of the “marriage market squeeze”) in the five-calendar-year interval
during which the marriage took place; and the year of marriage; and (2) regressions on
differences in age, human capital, and assets at marriage between husband and wife, as
a function of the year of marriage, the sex ratio when the marriage took place, and
differences in the corresponding parental background variables. The second set of re-
gressions enables us to examine whether schooling differences, age differences, and
asset differences are changing through time, controlling for parental background ef-
fects.
Our results show that more recently married husbands and wives are better edu-
cated and older than husbands and wives in earlier cohorts. Although husbands bring
more physical assets to marriage than wives, trends in physical assets at marriage are
less clear-cut. Asset values of husbands increase through time in four countries and
remain constant in Ethiopia and the Philippines. Asset values of wives increase in three
countries (Guatemala, Mexico, and South Africa), remain constant in Ethiopia and the
Philippines, and decrease in Bangladesh. In four out of six countries, age differences
between husband and wife have decreased; the exceptions are the Philippines and South
Africa where females marry later. In three out of six countries, husband–wife gaps in
schooling attainment at marriage have also decreased. Despite trends toward equality in
age and education (which argues for an improvement in the balance of power within
marriages), the distribution of assets at marriage continues to favor husbands. In three
out of six countries, the husband–wife asset difference has not changed through time—
and therefore continues to favor husbands—and in the other three countries it has in-
creased. Persistent differences in assets in favor of men have important implications for
household well-being and the welfare of future generations, given recent findings that
show that increasing women’s status and control of assets has favorable effects on a
number of human capital outcomes, particularly in the next generation.
7BACKGROUND AND METHODS
Assets at marriage and bargaining power
The IFPRI studies collected data on assets at marriage and conditions surround-
ing marriage to arrive at quantifiable indicators of bargaining power within marriage
that are exogenous to current marital decisions. Data on human capital at marriage, such
as schooling, have been collected in numerous surveys, but data on assets at marriage
are relatively rare. The data collection effort was largely motivated by the desire to test
the collective model of the household, which predicts that one’s share of resources re-
ceived within a relationship will be determined by one’s bargaining power within that
relationship.3 Because bargaining power is an elusive concept, candidate proxies for
bargaining power have included: (1) public provision of resources to specific household
members and exogenous policy changes that affect the intrahousehold distribution thereof
(Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997; Rubaclava and Thomas 2002); (2) shares of income
earned by women (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995); (3) unearned income (Schultz 1990;
Thomas 1990); (4) current assets (Doss 1999); (5) inherited assets (Quisumbing 1994);
and (6) assets at marriage (Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 2002). Of course, none
of these measures is perfect. In most contexts there are no public programs that can
serve as a natural experiment. Labor income, typically included in the calculation of
income shares, is problematic because it reflects time allocation and labor force partici-
pation decisions that are likely to have been the result of some bargaining process within
the marriage. Several studies use nonlabor income, either directly or as a way to deter-
mine total income (Thomas 1993). However, the assumption that nonlabor income is
independent of tastes and labor market conditions may not be true if much of it comes
from pensions, unemployment benefits, or earnings from assets accumulated over the
life cycle.
Current asset holdings, used by Doss (1999) in her study of Ghanaian house-
holds, may also be affected by asset accumulation decisions made within marriage. De-
pending on provisions of marriage laws, assets acquired within marriage may be consid-
ered joint property and will not be easily assignable to husband or wife. The validity of
inherited assets as an indicator of bargaining power may be conditional upon the receipt
8of assets prior to marriage, unless bargaining power also depends on the expected value
of inheritance. Inherited assets could also be correlated with individual unobservables,
such as previous investments in the individual during childhood (Strauss and Thomas
1995). Assets brought to marriage, however, are plausible indicators of bargaining power
that are not affected by the decisions made within the marriage (i.e., they are exogenous
to those decisions, although assets of husband and wife could be correlated if the mar-
riage market is characterized by assortative matching).
Differences in other husband–wife characteristics
and their implications
While a clear body of evidence has begun to emerge on how the assets of the hus-
band versus those of the wife affect various human capital investments and outcomes
within the household, assets brought to marriage are only one aspect of the conditions
surrounding marriage and later bargaining power within the union. Husband’s age and
educational seniority have also been used to connote male control over women (e.g., Cain
1984; Miller 1981). Educational differences can be viewed as a proxy for differences in
earning power, which influences bargaining power (e.g., Sen 1989). For example, Smith
et al. (forthcoming) base their measure of women’s decisionmaking power relative to their
male partners (usually their husbands) on four underlying indicators: whether a woman
works for cash, her age at first marriage, the age difference between her and her husband,
and the educational difference between her and her husband.
Aside from their use as proxies for differential economic resources, the effects of
spousal age differences on power imbalances have not been well studied. One issue has to
do with measurement error: Measurement error in the age variable is likely in low-literacy
populations with unreliable civil registration systems. Another issue is the difficulty of
predicting the effect of age differences outside a particular social and cultural context.
Recent studies from sub-Saharan Africa, for example, show that wider age differ-
ences between sexual partners lead to greater HIV vulnerability for young women (e.g.,
Gregson et al. 2002; Kelly et al. 2001), presumably through their correlation with male
wealth advantage and, hence, the lower bargaining power of females. However, the
9reverse effect could also be true if women, especially in patriarchal settings, derive
status from their husband’s characteristics. This would imply that having a husband who
is senior in age, education, or economic means would impart well-being (e.g., Kishor
1995). In fact, only a handful of studies have documented the extent of such differences
between spouses. Notable exceptions include Luke and Kurz (2002), who reviewed lit-
erature on the extent of age-mixing in sexual relationships in sub-Saharan Africa and
found that a sizable proportion of sexual partners of adolescent girls are at least 6–10
years older. Hertrich (2002) documents trends in age at first marriage for men and women
in African countries where survey or census information is available for at least two
points in time; she finds women’s marriage age is increasing, the trend for men is mixed,
and spousal age differences are declining.
Mensch, Bruce, and Greene (1998) used DHS data from Colombia, Egypt, and
Turkey to document spousal age differences by woman’s age at marriage and found that
even after controlling for female education, spousal age differences are larger among
women who marry before age 20. Kishor and Neitzel (1996), also using DHS data,
report spousal educational differences for 25 countries. In 16 countries husbands are
likely to have more education; in seven countries education levels are likely to be equal;
only in Brazil and the Philippines are women more likely to be better educated than their
husbands. Casterline, Williams, and McDonald (1986) examine spousal age differences
in 28 developing countries using World Fertility Survey data; they find that age differ-
ences are generally largest in societies that are patriarchal and have patrilineal kinship
organization (including much of sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and some of
South Asia) and smallest in settings where the traditional social structure allows for
more equal status of spouses and/or where processes of modernization have improved
the status of women (including many countries in Southeast and East Asia, Latin America,
and the Caribbean).
Data collection methodology
Separate qualitative studies on different aspects of gender, including marriage
customs, informed the design of surveys in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Guatemala, and South
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Africa. In Mexico and the Philippines, an extensive review of the anthropological litera-
ture and interviews with anthropologists and researchers who had worked on marriage
customs in those countries influenced questionnaire design. The authors and their col-
leagues participated in intensive pretests of the survey modules in all countries except
Mexico.
Because each data set has specific features related to the purpose of the survey,
we discuss only the common features of the data in this section, and leave the country-
specific details for later. All the modules on assets brought to marriage include informa-
tion on the premarital human and physical capital of each spouse (e.g., age, education,
work experience, land, livestock, other assets), year of marriage, and parents’ back-
ground. A variety of assets brought to the marriage were recorded, as well as all trans-
fers made at the time of marriage (brideprice, dowries, and gifts) where applicable.
Some of the surveys also collected information on the marriage histories of each spouse
(Ethiopia), the circumstances surrounding the marriage (e.g., type of marriage contract,
involvement in the choice of a spouse, relative ranking of parents’ social status;
Bangladesh, Ethiopia); social networks of the wife (Bangladesh, Guatemala, South Af-
rica); inheritance by siblings (Philippines); and gender-specific information on income
streams and control and ownership of land, livestock, and other assets (Bangladesh,
Ethiopia, Philippines). In four of the surveys (except Mexico and South Africa), the
reported values of assets at the time of marriage have been converted to survey-year
values using the national consumer price index and the year of marriage. For Mexico, we
used an asset index, and for South Africa, a count of assets at marriage. Details regarding
the construction of the asset measures are found in the country-specific sections.
Empirical methodology
We first estimate a series of levels regressions on husband’s and wife’s human
capital (education), age at marriage, and assets brought to marriage using the general
form:
Ai = α + β(year of marriage) + γ1(sex ratio) +
γ2(human capital of parents)i + γ3(physical capital of parents)i +
δ(other family background variables)i + εi (1)
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where A is a vector consisting of outcomes such as human capital, age at marriage, and
assets, all evaluated at the time of marriage for each i, i = h, w (for husband and wife,
respectively); year of marriage is the reported year of marriage, which is the same for
husband and wife; sex ratio is the ratio of females to males of marriageable age in the
five calendar-year interval in which the marriage took place; human capital of parents is
an indicator of the parents’ educational attainment (usually years of schooling); physical
capital of parents includes landholdings of parents (which in some cases are disaggre-
gated for fathers and mothers); other family background variables include other indica-
tors of parental status, number of male and female siblings, birth order, and so forth; and
ε is an error term. We estimate (1) separately for husbands and wives.
With the exception of the sex ratio, all explanatory variables were obtained from
the household surveys. The sex ratio (defined as the ratio of females in the age category
corresponding to the mean marriage age of females to that of males in the corresponding
mean marriage age category) was obtained from United Nations country-level popula-
tion statistics. While it would have been desirable to have district- or village-level sex
ratios corresponding to the marriage year, historical data at this level of disaggregation
for each study site were not available. We therefore used the country-level figures in-
stead. Because this variable is defined at the country level, it masks the possibility that
some areas within the same country (e.g., rural areas with high rates of male outmigration)
may have a relative surplus of marriageable wives, while other areas may have a deficit.
It also does not capture possible differences in the supply of marriageable individuals of
a specific caste or race, if interracial or intercaste marriages are rare. Thus, the coeffi-
cients on the sex ratio variable should be interpreted with caution as it is a very imper-
fect measure of the “marriage squeeze.” We use year of marriage rather than year of
birth as an explanatory variable owing to difficulties in recalling birth year; because
marriage is a more recent event, respondents were better able to recall the year of mar-
riage or the number of years they had been married.4 We do not include education as a
regressor in the age at marriage equation because the same variables that determine age
at marriage may also influence educational attainment, especially in societies where
young women leave school in order to get married. While one approach could have been
to estimate an age at marriage equation with education treated as endogenous, in prac-
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tice it is very difficult to find instrumental variables that would affect only education but
not age at marriage.
To ascertain whether differences between husbands and wives are narrowing
across time, we also estimate a version of (1) in difference form:
dA = α' + β'(year of marriage) + γ1'(sex ratio) +
γ2'd(human capital of parents) + γ3'd(physical capital of parents) +
δ'd(other family background variables) + η (2)
where d is the difference between husband’s and wife’s variables, all variables in the equa-
tion (except year of marriage and the sex ratio) are in difference form, and η is the error term.
MARRIAGE PATTERNS IN ASIA, AFRICA,
AND LATIN AMERICA: AN OVERVIEW
In this section we present a descriptive overview of marriage trends in the six
study countries, characterizing the societies in which the data were gathered, describing
the samples, and examining trends in spousal characteristics and assortative matching
over time. Our sample consists of two countries each in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and
Latin America. Although partly motivated by reasons of data availability, we also chose
countries that were different rather than similar within each geographical region to high-
light the role of cultural differences and to determine whether, despite these differences,
there are common emerging trends.5
Country overviews
Table 1 consists of means and standard deviations of spousal characteristics at
marriage—age, schooling, and assets—while Table 2 presents trends in these variables
through time for all six study countries.
Bangladesh.6 Similar to other societies in South Asia, Bangladeshi society is domi-
nated by a patrilineal and patrilocal kinship system. Despite Islamic law, which in principle
applies to 85 percent of the population and allows women to own property, the practices of
benami, where husbands acquire property in their wives’ name, and naior, where daughters
are encouraged to relinquish their inheritance claims to their brothers, illustrate some of the
limitations that rural women face in exercising their property rights (Subramanian 1998).
13
Table 1 Assets at marriage and human capital of husband and wife
Husband Wife
Mean SD Mean SD
Asia
Bangladesh
Age at marriage (years) 23.8 5.7 15.0 3.8
Years of schooling 3.2 4.0 1.7 2.8
Value of assets + transfers at marriage (1996 taka) 36,428.5 150,560.2 12,950.1 20,139.5
Value of assets at marriage (1996 taka) 32,146.0 148,767.9 2,542.9 10,477.0
Value of transfers at marriage to husband/wife
(1996 taka) 4,258.7 15,116.7 10,333.5 16,339.0
Philippines
Age at marriage (years) 25.1 5.7 22.2 5.1
Years of schooling 6.3 3.1 6.3 3.0
Land area at marriage (hectares) 0.5 0.9 0.2 0.6
Value of nonland assets at marriage (1989 peso) 761.8 769.3 463.3 473.2
Africa
Ethiopia
Age at marriage (years) 26.3 7.6 17.9 6.0
Years of schooling 1.7 2.3 0.7 1.6
Value of assets at marriage (1997 birr) 4,584.0 8,340.3 1,918.0 3,744.4
South Africa
Age at marriage (years) 28.5 8.4 23.2 7.1
Years of schooling 5.2 3.8 5.1 3.6
Count of assets at marriage 2.1 1.6 0.7 1.0
Value of transfers from husband’s/wife’s
family at marriage (1998 rand) 36,272.4 50,740.4 6,435.4 22,680.6
Latin America
Mexico
Age at marriage (years) 23.3 6.3 18.4 4.0
Years of schooling 3.2 2.9 3.0 2.8
Owned land at marriage (1 if yes) 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.06
Asset score at marriage 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.06
Guatemala
Age at marriage (years) 22.6 5.1 19.9 3.7
Years of schooling 7.2 3.5 6.0 3.7
Value of assets at marriage (1999 quetzal) 5,226.8 12,013.8 727.4 1,684.5
The survey was conducted in 47 villages from three sites in rural Bangladesh,
each chosen as part of an impact evaluation of two agricultural technology dissemina-
tion programs (IFPRI-BIDS-INFS 1998). In two of the sites (Jessore and Saturia), NGO
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programs targeting women only promoted group-based fishponds and vegetable gar-
dening, respectively, providing training and credit. In the third site (Mymensingh), project
staff and Department of Fisheries extension agents provided training in fishpond culti-
vation to relatively well-off households and the same training, combined with credit, to
relatively poorer households. This program was intended for both men and women,
although in practice more men were beneficiaries. Each round of the four-round survey,
conducted every four months from June 1996 to September 1997, collected information
on household expenditures on various food, health, and other items. In addition, informa-
tion on parental and sibling background for both the husband and wife was collected, and
in the last round information was collected on premarriage assets, transfers at marriage,
inheritance, and indicators of women’s mobility and empowerment. In particular, respon-
dents were asked to recall the assets they owned before their wedding (e.g., land, cattle,
housing, food items, and “durables”—jewelry, clothes, and household utensils). Ques-
tions were designed based on the findings of a qualitative study conducted in two villages
from each of the three sites (Naved 2000). The reported values of these assets at the time of
marriage were converted to current values using the national consumer price index.
The first notable finding is that Bangladeshi wives bring far less to the marriage
than do their husbands, as measured by the value of premarital assets (in 1996 taka) and
years of schooling (Table 1). Indeed, the value of female assets seems to have decreased
through time, while that of males has increased (Table 2). Female assets typically con-
sist of food items and durable goods. In addition, a specific module about gifts and
transfers at marriage was administered to the female respondents. Transfers to the bride
and groom include assets and cash and were computed by summing up all transfers to
each individual and assigning to each individual half of the transfers reported “to the
couple.” Data presented in Table 1 show an average net transfer to the bride at the time
of marriage, although more recent weddings exhibit a net transfer to the groom (Table
2). This is consistent with the shift from brideprice (paid by the groom) to dowry (paid
by the bride’s family) reported in Naved (2000).7 In no case are the transfers at marriage
enough to overcome the value of the other resources, including cattle and housing, that
men bring to the union, however, as indicated by the husband’s advantage in the sum
total of prewedding assets and marriage transfer payments.
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Bangladeshi women have the youngest age at marriage across the six studies
(Table 1), although age at marriage has been increasing through time (Table 2). Men’s
age at marriage is on par with that of men from the Philippines and Latin America. There
is also a gender gap in education of spouses. However, with the introduction in the past
decade of “Food for Education” and other female education subsidy programs (Ahmed
and del Ninno 2002), spousal education gaps are narrowing (see Table 2; discussed
more below). Indeed, the higher levels of schooling reported by wives in the last five-
year period may be the result of such programs that link receipt of food and other assis-
tance to secondary school attendance.
Philippines. Unlike Bangladesh, the other Asian country in our sample, the Phil-
ippines is characterized by bilateral kinship and bilateral inheritance patterns, and both
anthropological studies (e.g., Medina 1991) and studies on intrahousehold allocation
support the notion that Philippine society is basically egalitarian (Estudillo, Quisumbing,
and Otsuka 2001a, 2001b). For example, the word for “child” in Tagalog does not dis-
tinguish between “son” or “daughter”; in some Philippine languages there is no distinc-
tion between “husband” and “wife.” Egalitarian distribution does not necessarily mean
that men and women within the same household receive the same transfers from par-
ents. In the lowland Philippines, for example, parental preferences in land inheritance
may favor male children in communities where farming requires intensive male labor
(Estudillo, Quisumbing, and Otsuka 2001a, 2001b). Among the Ilocanos of the northern
Philippines parents traditionally give a portion of their landholdings to a newly married
son as a gift. Some writers (e.g., MacArthur 1977, cited in Caldwell et al. 1998) term
this as bridewealth; the local term (sabong) means male land dowry (Anderson 1962).
Both primogeniture and ultimogeniture—inheritance by the first- and last-born, respec-
tively—are practiced among the Ilocanos depending on the availability of land. Among
the Ilonggos of Panay Island in the middle Philippines, daughters and sons may receive
land rights more equally and independently than the Ilocanos, although in land-con-
strained households, children who help their parents farm receive more land than do
their siblings.
Preferential land inheritance in favor of males is balanced by higher educational
attainment of females, at least since the expansion of public education in the 1960s. An
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ethnographic study by Bouis et al. (1998) indicates that parental decisions regarding
schooling depend on the inherent attitudes of the child. According to this study, Filipino
parents invest in the schooling of girls because they are “more studious,” “patient,”
“willing to sacrifice,” and “interested in their studies,” traits that would make them
succeed in school. Boys, on the other hand, are more prone to vices (such as drinking),
are fond of “roaming around” and “playing with their barkada” (peer group), and have
to be “reminded” and “scolded” to do their schoolwork.
The data used for our analysis come from a retrospective survey of 344 house-
holds in five rice-growing villages in the Philippines with different agroecological char-
acteristics conducted from June to October 1989. Two of the villages are in Central
Luzon and three are on Panay Island. The 1989 survey included questions on the par-
ents, siblings, and children of the respondents, yielding information on three genera-
tions called the grandparents’, parents’ (respondents and siblings), and (grand)children’s
generations. Respondents were asked about the premarriage wealth (education and land
ownership) of their parents and in-laws, their own and their spouses’ education and
inheritance, and the schooling of and proposed bequests to their children. Spouses were
present during most of the interviews, facilitating collection of data on spouses’ family
background.8 Respondents were also asked about the transfers of land and assets re-
ceived by each sibling regardless of whether the individual lived in the survey area or
had migrated.9
Compared with Bangladesh, women in the Philippines marry at later ages (Table
1), although, in this rural sample, there is no clear trend toward rising marriage age
(Table 2). Filipino men bring more land and assets to marriage, but there is no gender
gap in education in this group of respondents.
Ethiopia. Ethiopia is characterized by substantial ethnic and religious diversity;
the country has over 85 ethnic groups with most major world and animist religions
represented, making it difficult to generalize about gender roles (Webb and von Braun
1994). The ethnographic literature suggests, however, that women’s status is relatively
higher in the north but declines as one goes south. Ethiopia’s diversity extends beyond
the people and their cultures to its environment; agroecological zones, and consequently
farming systems, vary substantially around the country. Currently, Ethiopia ranks as one
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of the poorest countries in the world, in part a reflection of its tumultuous recent history;
over the past decade it has experienced drought, famine, civil war, and the demise of a
military government.
The 1997 Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) interviewed approximately
1,500 households in 15 villages across Ethiopia, thus capturing much of the diversity
described above.10 While sample households within villages were randomly selected,
the choice of the villages themselves was purposive to ensure that the major farming
systems were represented. As such, the sample cannot be taken as representative of rural
Ethiopia as a whole, but it does capture much of the country’s diversity.
The survey collected information from ever-married individuals regarding their
circumstances at the time of marriage (e.g., age, education, experience, family back-
ground, and assets) as well as the circumstances surrounding the marriage itself (e.g.,
type of marriage contract used, if any; decisionmaker regarding the choice of a spouse;
and so forth). Assets brought to the marriage and transfers made at the time of the mar-
riage were recorded. The value of assets at the time of marriage is inflated to current
value based on the date of marriage and a national consumer price index. Only house-
holds with a partnership are considered, yielding a sample of 1,347 households, of which
this paper examines approximately 550 first marriages.11 Marriage is a fluid state in
Ethiopia; divorce is frequent and serial marriages are common (Pankhurst 1992). We
focus on first marriage because of its significance in Ethiopian society, which is due to
the economic value put on virginity and the greater likelihood that the marriage in-
volved a bond between households, rather than a personal arrangement by the bride and
groom (Pankhurst 1992, p. 122).
Given the complications inherent in a long recall period and the choice of inflation
factor for these items it is difficult to measure premarital assets precisely. Nonetheless
clear patterns emerge. On average men bring substantially more physical and human capi-
tal to the marriage than do women (Table 1). Contrary to expectations, ritual gifts (e.g.,
brideprice or dowry) account for only a small proportion of the transfers of ownership that
take place at the time of marriage (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002). On average, the
groom’s family spends three times as much as the bride’s family in gifts to the bride’s
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family or to the bride and groom. The amounts involved are quite small, on average,
however, and the median is always zero; hence we do not analyze them separately.
The great majority of the new couple’s assets are brought to the marriage by the
newlyweds themselves, with grooms bringing substantially more start-up capital than
brides. Assets brought to marriage vary dramatically among couples, however, with a
median of zero for most asset categories except livestock and jewelry/clothing/linen.
Contrary to the preconception that marriage is the time at which parents endow their
offspring with farmland, most of the land brought by grooms was already theirs prior to
marriage. This finding may be specific to Ethiopia, given that the state nominally owns
all land (e.g., Gavian and Ehui 1999; Gavian and Teklu 1996). User rights over land are
supposed to be allocated by peasant associations (PAs), the local administrative units in
rural areas, although many regions of the country have not experienced land realloca-
tions in recent years. Many young men may wait until the PA allocates them land before
deciding to marry. In recent years, marriages have been delayed both because of poverty
and because of state policies that have restricted land allocation, labor mobility, and
house construction. Pankhurst (1992) notes that given chronic land shortages, a growing
population, and increasing corruption, most young households had to wait before being
allocated their own plot of land. The sale of labor within the community and seasonal
labor migration were restricted, and after villagization,12 even building a new hut was
problematic. This is reflected in lower values of assets at marriage through time for both
husbands and wives, but particularly for husbands (Table 2). Whether these time trends
are significant must be confirmed by the regressions that control for other confounding
variables. While both husbands and wives appear to be obtaining more schooling through
time, the improvement in schooling attainment seems to be greater for husbands.
South Africa. KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa’s most populated province, is ethni-
cally diverse, although not to the degree of Ethiopia. More than three-quarters of its
people are African (nearly all of these Zulu), 10 percent are Indian, 7 percent are white,
and 1 percent are colored. Ethnographic evidence on marriage contracts and other rela-
tions between men and women indicate large differences in African versus Indian cul-
tural traditions. The marriage agreement in the Zulu tradition, as is common in many
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other African cultures, involves a bridewealth payment, or lobola, from the groom and
his family to the bride’s family before the couple can marry. Among Indians, the more
common traditional scenario is dowry, with the majority of payments being made from
the bride’s to the groom’s family.
The South African survey, the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS),
includes Africans and Indians from both rural and urban areas.13 Aside from Guatemala,
South Africa is the only other country in this study that includes urban areas. Despite the
fact that South Africa is an upper-middle-income country with a 1997 per capita GNP of
approximately $3,000, the country’s wealth is distributed very unequally, and the major-
ity of the population lives in poverty (Carter and May 1998). Although it is not the
poorest province, KwaZulu-Natal is relatively poor despite being relatively urban. In
addition to their cultural differences, Africans and Indians differ economically. For ex-
ample, annual per capita expenditures for Africans average just under $500 while for
Indians expenditures are nearly four times as large. Africans and rural residents have
relatively low educational attainment, reflecting historical disparities in access to edu-
cation.
For couples (75 percent of whom were African and 25 percent Indian), informa-
tion was collected on whether or not each partner owned a variety of assets before mar-
riage, including cattle, other livestock, land, a house, and jewelry. A simple count of the
number of assets owned by each partner is used as a proxy for assets owned at marriage
(Table 1). While this measure obviates the need for respondents to impute values of
items owned in the distant past, it suffers from the same concerns regarding assets at
marriage described in detail above, that is, it is imprecise. Owing to sensitivities in the
reporting of asset ownership (stemming from apartheid-era abuses), information on family
background wealth was not collected. However, given the combination of late age at
marriage and short life expectancy of parent generations, survival of the parent to a
child’s marriage year is not always the rule (approximately 80 percent of mothers and 65
percent of fathers are living at the time of their child’s marriage), and is therefore used
as an indicator of parental social and economic resources available to a bride or groom.
In South Africa, as in the other countries described in this paper, men bring far
more assets to the marriage than do women. They do not, however, have more schooling
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than women, reflecting historic and current trends in gender equity in educational at-
tainment within traditional race categories (Statistics South Africa 2001; United Na-
tions Development Programme 2000). Both men’s and women’s schooling levels have
risen through time (Table 2). Compared with Ethiopia, South African men and women
marry late (Table 1), with age at marriage rising in recent years as well (Table 2). Owing
to the dominance of the Zulu population in our sample, we see large mean marriage
payments from the groom’s side to the bride’s side. However, marriage payments from
each side have fallen with time, reflecting the modernization that has come with the
opening up of former African homelands and with later generations of Indians becom-
ing more distanced from the dowry customs of South Asian society (Table 2). Africans
make higher marriage transfer payments than Indians, and amounts transferred from the
husband’s side are more than double those from the wife’s side, consistent with the Zulu
tradition of lobola. Over time, differences in spousal education and marriage payments
from each side have narrowed. Disparities in age at marriage and assets brought to mar-
riage appear not to have changed, although the mean differences here are not large to
begin with. For Africans, however, there are statistically significant spousal differences
in each outcome. Relative to their wives, African men are one year older, have one less
year of schooling, bring more assets to marriage, and have families that make more
marriage payments.
Mexico. Data on assets at marriage in rural Mexico were collected as part of the
evaluation of the impact of PROGRESA on women’s status and intrahousehold
decisionmaking (Adato et al. 2000; de la Brière and Quisumbing 2000). IFPRI and
PROGRESA teams jointly designed a module to collect information on family back-
ground and the human and physical capital of the husband and wife (assets at mar-
riage).14 Previous work on marriage patterns in Mesoamerica (e.g., Robicheaux 1997)
was instrumental in the design of this module, which was first administered to a group
of promotoras (community organizers) in February 1999 as a pilot. Based on the results
of the pilot and further discussion with PROGRESA staff, a module on family back-
ground was fielded as a part of the June–July 1999 evaluation survey round.15
The module on family background and assets at marriage asked the wife to report
whether or not she and her husband owned land, farm assets, farm animals, a house, or
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consumer durables at the time of marriage. The question was asked separately regarding
the husband’s and wife’s assets but neither the quantity in each category nor the value of
each asset was asked. We used a modification of a procedure employed by Morris et al.
(1999) to arrive at an aggregate asset index for each spouse.16 The asset score for each
spouse was computed by assigning to each item on the list of assets (g) a weight equal to
the reciprocal of the proportion of husbands and wives who reported owning the item at
the time of marriage (wg), multiplying that weight by the indicator (zero or one) that the
spouse owned the particular asset g (fg), and summing the product over all possible assets
spouse’s asset score = 100 (Σfg • wg) for g = 1, ..., G. (3)
The choice of the weighting system is based on the assumption that households
would be progressively less likely to own a particular item the higher its monetary value.
Morris et al. (1999) find that the log of the asset score is highly correlated with the log of
the household asset value (computed by summing the reported value of assets) and thus
is a good proxy indicator of household wealth.17 We did not include land in the asset
score; rather, two dummy variables indicate whether the husband and the wife had land
at the time of marriage.
Husbands enter marriage with more physical capital than their wives: husbands’
asset scores were twice those of their wives (Table 1). Thirteen percent of husbands had
land at the time of marriage, compared to less than one percent of wives. Table 1 also
indicates that husbands have more years of schooling than wives, suggesting that they
enter a union with slightly more human capital as well. If, as the literature suggests, human
and physical capital significantly influence bargaining power within marriage, rural Mexi-
can husbands wield more power within their households than their wives. However, Table
2 indicates that women’s schooling levels have increased through time, although the asset
index continues to favor males. The age at marriage has also increased for women, with no
clear trends for males. This suggests that for some measure of resources at marriage—
those related to human capital—gaps between husband and wife may be decreasing.
Guatemala. The data from Guatemala were collected as part of an IFPRI impact
evaluation of the Hogares Comunitarios government-sponsored daycare program.18 It in-
cluded a random sample of 1,363 women with a child aged 0–7 years from Mixco, one of the
three urban zones of Guatemala City where Hogares Comunitarios was operating in 1999.
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The household survey collected data on household demographic and socioeco-
nomic characteristics, maternal characteristics and employment, childcare arrangements,
maternal family background and social networks, and maternal and child anthropom-
etry. Among the family background variables of interest are factors that may have shaped
a woman’s labor force behavior during adolescence and early adulthood, such as the
composition of her natal household and her mother’s work behavior and childcare utili-
zation patterns when the study woman was a child, as well as the value of nine major
categories of assets that the woman or her husband brought to her most recent marriage
(or union) (house, land, furniture, vehicle, stove, sewing machine, linens and bedding,
savings, other).
As the purpose of the original study was to evaluate the benefits children and
their mothers received from the Hogares Comunitarios daycare program, family back-
ground information on husbands was not collected. Human capital information was avail-
able, however, for current husbands. In this sample 1,290 women had ever been mar-
ried; 1,136 were currently married; and 997 current marriages were first marriages, of
which 976 wives were able to provide complete background information on themselves.
In Guatemala, husbands have completed more years of schooling than wives (Table
1), and they bring more assets to marriage as well. Both husbands’ and wives’ years of
schooling have increased through time (Table 2), along with wife’s age at marriage.
Although both husbands and wives also bring more assets to marriage through time, the
relative percentage that wives bring is increasing only slightly with time.
Trends in assortative matching through time
One way of characterizing the marriage process is to examine the criteria through
which spouses are matched. Are spouses matched randomly, or is marriage character-
ized by assortative matching? While a thorough analysis of assortative matching—the
tendency of individuals to select partners who are most similar to them—is outside the
scope of this paper (see Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2003b), we can examine the degree
to which the socioeconomic characteristics of spouses are correlated, and whether this
correlation has changed through time. We examine patterns in the correlation between
personal characteristics of husbands and wives, and between their parents’ characteris-
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tics, to indicate whether personal characteristics are more or less important than familial
characteristics in one’s choice of a spouse, and whether the importance of personal ver-
sus parent characteristics has changed through time.
Table 3 presents simple correlation coefficients between a husband’s and wife’s
personal and parent characteristics for five-year intervals corresponding to the year of
marriage for all our study countries. To avoid “noise” from excessively small sample
sizes, we report only those correlation coefficients for samples with at least 14 observa-
tions. Not surprisingly, age at marriage of both husband and wife is highly correlated in
all time periods, with no discernible time trend in the correlation coefficients. In
Bangladesh, positive assortative matching based on schooling appears to be stronger
than matching based on assets or parent characteristics. Matching based on wedding
transfer payments is greater than that on assets brought to marriage, while the correla-
tion between parents’ land is higher than that between parents’ schooling. The strength
of sorting based on personal versus parent characteristics is a possible indication of
individual choice, as individuals—particularly girls—become more educated and exer-
cise a stronger role in the choice of a spouse, even if marriages are still arranged by
parents.
In the Philippines, positive assortative matching is evident in nonland assets at
marriage in addition to sorting based on age and schooling. Matching based on spousal
characteristics is greater than that based on parental characteristics, with the exception
of maternal schooling. In the Philippines, marriages are no longer arranged by parents,
although young people are reluctant to marry without parental approval (MacArthur
1977). Surprisingly, the correlation between mothers’ schooling is higher than that for
fathers’ schooling, or even parents’ land, probably indicating the importance that moth-
ers play in the choice or approval of a future spouse. An interesting feature is the low,
and often negative, correlation between spouses’ land at marriage. Although a groom’s
parents will typically give their son land to farm, if a groom enters marriage without
land, the bride’s parents will provide land. Thus, land bestowal behavior tends to be
compensatory rather than strategic in Philippine marriages.
In Ethiopia, the highest correlation is between spouses’ age at marriage, followed
by years of schooling. Sorting based on assets at marriage is evident as well, indicating
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the presence of assortative matching, although it operates on a variety of levels that
cannot be summarized into a single additive index (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2003b).
In South Africa, the strongest correlations are between age at marriage and years of
schooling; assortative matching based on assets appears to be weaker. Interestingly, the
correlation between marriage payments is weak, and in more recent years is negative,
indicating both that traditional marriage systems are weakening and that, instead of
competing to bestow their children with assets, families of the bride and groom may
“trade off” or compensate transfers from each side. While we have limited information
on family background in the South Africa survey, the available data show that sorting
along paternal education exists, and is stronger than that along maternal education. The
correlation between maternal education of both spouses has decreased through time.
In both Latin American countries, the strongest correlations are between spousal
age and years of schooling. In Mexico, matching based on land brought to marriage is
weak, probably because women very rarely, if ever, bring land to marriage. Correlations
among parent characteristics—fathers’ schooling, mothers’ schooling, and land—are
positive, but not as strong as the correlation with spouses’ schooling. Indeed, the corre-
lations between fathers’ schooling, mothers’ schooling, and parents’ land seem to have
decreased through time. This is consistent with evidence that personal characteristics of
spouses have become more important in the choice of a marriage partner; younger Mexi-
can women emphasize trust, intimacy, and communication more than women of their
mothers’ generation, who attach greater importance to marrying someone from a good
family (Hirsch 2003). Owing to limited information on the family background of hus-
bands, we cannot perform the same degree of analysis for the Guatemala data; however,
we find that correlations between spouses’ age at marriage and years of schooling are
high, higher than those between assets at marriage for both spouses.
REGRESSION RESULTS
Bangladesh. Table 4 presents regressions on years of schooling, age at marriage,
and value of assets at marriage for husbands and wives. Findings show that while both
spouses are more educated in more recent marriages, the gains for women are larger.
This finding is consistent with recent shifts in education finance policies designed to
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close the male–female schooling gap. Despite this trend toward more gender equity in
education, changes over time in the value of assets brought to marriage (defined here as
the sum of premarital assets and payments made at the time of marriage) show distinct
patterns favoring men.19 Age at marriage has been rising for both sexes over time, but
more so for women. Rising education and age at marriage, especially for females, re-
flect overall changes in the economy of Bangladesh. Severe declines in the average size
of landholdings of rural households owing to population growth may encourage parents
to invest in the education of their children in the hope that they will be better-equipped
to obtain nonfarm jobs in the emerging market-based economy (Caldwell et al. 1998).
The female-to-male marriageable age population sex ratio at the time of the mar-
riage has the effect of reducing women’s schooling and age at marriage, consistent with
a hypothesis of female competition for scarce males. Increases in this ratio also raise the
total wealth (assets plus transfers) that both men and women bring to marriage, but the
effect for males is much greater.
Parent characteristics are important determinants of education, age, and assets at
marriage. The value of own parents’ land, the major form of wealth-holding in rural
Bangladesh, increases levels of schooling and the value of assets brought to marriage of
both husbands and wives. This is consistent with better-resourced parents investing in
and passing on resources to the next generation regardless of sex (Edlund 1997, 2000;
Gardner 1995). Parents’ land, however, reduces age at marriage for women, consistent
with the notion that wealthier parents do not have to save for long periods of time to
accumulate sufficient dowry to marry their daughters. Young marriage age for women
has traditionally been highly valued in Bangladeshi society. It is argued by Goody (1976,
cited in Caldwell et al. 1998) that this is based on the notion that girls can better marry
into “good” families if they are virgins and hence bring no possibility of “other” descen-
dants (through past sexual relations or pregnancy) who may attempt to claim entitle-
ment to inheritance or property. Higher-birth-order children bring more assets to mar-
riage, although after controlling for birth order, additional siblings reduce the marriage
assets of husbands. Parental schooling increases the educational attainment of both hus-
bands and wives. For wives, paternal and maternal education each increase the value of
33
total assets she brings to marriage but have opposing effects on her marriage age, possi-
bly reflecting differences in parental preferences regarding daughter’s marriage age.
Turning to differences between husbands and wives, we observe in Table 5 that
husband age and schooling seniority are decreasing over time but husband asset advan-
tage is getting larger. In an earlier specification with assets and transfer payments en-
tered separately, not reported here, it was found that net wedding transfer payments are
made increasingly to husbands, consistent with evidence of dowry inflation in South
Asia. The sex ratio significantly increases husband’s schooling advantage. The only
family background variable that is statistically significant is the difference between par-
ents’ land values, and the magnitude of the effects is not large. The greater the difference
between land owned by the husband’s and the wife’s family, the greater the difference
between husband’s and wife’s age and assets brought to marriage.
Philippines. Table 6 presents regressions on years of schooling, age at marriage,
land area, and nonland assets at marriage for husbands and wives. Reflecting the expan-
sion of public education in the 1960s, both husbands and wives are more educated in
Table 5 Determinants of (husband–wife) differences in years of schooling, age at
marriage, and assets at marriage, Bangladesh (OLS with robust standard errors)
Value of assets
Years of schooling Age at marriage at marriage
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Year of marriage –0.03 –3.20 –0.04 –2.98 386.16 1.80
Sex ratio 2.31 1.72 –0.51 –0.23 48,648.66 1.04
Differences in:
No. of brothers –0.03 –0.52 0.03 0.44 3,278.32 1.60
No. of sisters –0.02 –0.30 0.00 0.06 1,304.91 0.87
Value of parents’ land 0.00 –1.25 0.00 2.09 11.04 2.17
Father’s schooling 0.02 0.25 –0.10 –0.95 –472.77 –0.19
Mother’s schooling 0.12 0.88 –0.16 –1.14 –215.10 –0.07
Constant 57.43 3.13 96.34 3.26 –794,488.00 –1.86
No. of observations 724 729 710
F-statistic 2.67 2.50 2.34
Prob >F 0.01 0.02 0.02
R2 0.03 0.02 0.02
t-statistics in bold indicate significance at 10 percent or better.
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more recent marriages. In line with rising levels of education, age at marriage has also
been increasing for both men and women. However, while husband’s land area at mar-
riage has remained constant, the trend is distinctly negative for women, probably be-
cause of increased land scarcity and the increasing tendency of Filipino parents to give
land to sons and schooling to daughters (Estudillo, Quisumbing, and Otsuka 2001b).
There are no clear time trends in nonland assets.
Parental characteristics are important determinants of both age at marriage and
human and physical capital brought to marriage. Father’s land, a proxy for parental
wealth, increases age at marriage and land area for both husband and wife. In Ilocano-
speaking areas such as our Central Luzon sites, land from the groom’s parents is consid-
ered essential for starting a new family unit. Mother’s land increases land area that
wives bring to marriage, as well as husband’s nonland assets. Father’s schooling in-
creases nonland assets of the wife, but has a slight negative effect on husband’s land,
probably because fathers with more schooling are likely to be working in nonagricul-
tural occupations and may have less land. Mother’s schooling has a positive and signifi-
cant effect on wife’s schooling, which is larger than the effect of father’s schooling, and
a negative (but only weakly significant) effect on husband’s nonland assets. Unlike in
Bangladesh, the sex ratio does not affect years of schooling, age at marriage, or land
area, and has only a weak positive effect on husband’s nonland assets.
Turning to changes in the difference between men and women over time, we find
that age, schooling, and asset differences do not change through time (Table 7). This is
not surprising given the underlying egalitarian social structure of Philippine society.
The only gap that seems to be increasing through time is that in land area: Husbands are
bringing more land to marriage than their wives. While this may seem to increase the
bargaining power of men within the household, it is offset by women’s rising education
levels and their increasing propensity to be employed in nonfarm jobs, which have higher
returns to schooling (Estudillo, Quisumbing, and Otsuka 2001b). The only significant
parental background variable in the entire set of regressions is the difference between
husband’s and wife’s fathers’ land, which is positive and significant. That is, the greater
the difference between land owned by the husband’s father and the wife’s father, the
greater the difference between the husband’s and wife’s land area at marriage. The sex
36
ratio or “marriage squeeze” factor does not affect the gap between the resources that
each spouse brings to marriage.
Ethiopia. Similar to the results from Bangladesh and the Philippines, more recent
marriages are characterized by husbands and wives with more schooling (Table 8).
Father’s schooling has a strong positive influence on husband’s schooling, but none of
the parental background variables significantly affects wife’s schooling. Trends in age
at marriage in Ethiopia appear counterintuitive: age at first marriage seems to be declin-
ing for both men and women. This could be due to reporting error in the age variable and
thus should be taken with caution. Evidence from Hertrich (2002) and the National
Family Fertility Survey (Central Statistical Authority 1993), for example, suggests that
women’s age at marriage, though still quite low, has increased over time (World Bank
1998).20 Husbands whose parents have more land appear to marry later, while those with
more brothers marry earlier, perhaps because of the availability of substitutes for male
labor on the family farm. While human capital has been increasing at marriage, the real
value of physical capital brought to marriage has not changed appreciably through time,
contrary to the descriptive results.21 Parental land increases the value of assets that hus-
bands bring to marriage, while mother’s schooling increases the value of assets that
Table 7 Determinants of (husband–wife) differences in years of schooling, age at
marriage, land area, and assets at marriage, Philippines (OLS with robust standard
errors)
Years of schooling Age at marriage Land area Nonland assets
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Year of marriage 0.00 0.22 0.02 0.79 0.02 3.83 1.97 0.81
Sex ratio 1.28 0.31 –0.71 –0.12 0.00 0.00 755.26 1.15
Differences in:
Father’s schooling 0.02 0.42 –0.06 –0.80 0.01 0.30 –16.17 –1.37
Mother’s schooling –0.01 –0.20 –0.10 –0.92 0.01 0.20 –13.36 –0.91
Father’s land 0.02 0.47 0.06 1.05 0.05 2.54 0.99 0.13
Mother’s land 0.22 1.62 0.00 –0.03 0.03 1.11 24.11 1.66
Constant –7.05 –0.29 –36.43 –0.71 –33.61 –3.87 –4,459.98 –0.95
No. of observations 259 259 259 259
F-statistic 0.70 0.88 4.49 1.31
Prob >F 0.65 0.51 0.00 0.25
R2 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.04
t-statistics in bold indicate significance at 10 percent or better.
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wives bring. Probably due to sibling competition effects, wives with more sisters bring
fewer assets to marriage.
The ratio of women to men of marriageable age affects neither schooling nor
assets brought to marriage, but increases marriage age for both men and women. This
may reflect a longer waiting time for women, owing to a larger supply of marriageable
women. Facing a market in which there are fewer males per marriageable woman, males
may also feel no pressure to marry early.
How have differences between husbands and wives changed over time? Age dif-
ferences between husbands and wives have declined (Table 9). A marriage in which the
husband’s mother is better educated than the wife’s mother is associated with a smaller
age difference between husband and wife. The increasing gender gap in schooling at-
tainment at marriage is more surprising, although this effect is only weakly significant.
While overall schooling levels of husbands and wives have increased, the difference
between husbands and wives is also increasing. Differences in father’s schooling in-
Table 9 Determinants of (husband–wife) differences in years of schooling, age at
marriage, and assets at marriage, Ethiopia, first marriages only (OLS with robust
standard errors)
Value of assets
Years of schooling Age at marriage at marriage
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Year of marriage 0.04 1.72 –0.18 –3.45 –124.89 –1.52
Sex ratio –0.55 –0.08 –3.59 –0.27 8,407.69 0.47
Differences in:
Father’s schooling 1.26 3.82 –0.31 –0.45 –750.54 –1.53
Mother’s schooling –0.01 –0.01 –2.48 –1.90 2,982.81 1.57
Parents’ land 0.00 –4.62 0.00 1.31 19.17 13.11
No. of brothers –0.05 –1.29 0.03 0.38 –155.96 –1.40
No. of sisters 0.00 0.04 –0.10 –1.10 –152.99 –1.57
Constant –76.84 –2.10 368.26 4.27 236,732.10 1.69
No. of observations 525 548 552
F-statistic 11.81 12.52 43.47
Prob >F 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.07 0.139 0.09
t-statistics and F-statistics in bold indicate significance at 10 percent or better.
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crease the gap between husband’s and wife’s schooling, but differences in parental land
in favor of the husband’s parents reduce the schooling gap between husband and wife. It
is possible that fathers who are better educated invest more in their sons’ education, but
families who have more land are less likely to do so, given the heavy involvement of
males in Ethiopian agriculture. Husbands also tend to bring more assets than their wives
to marriage if their families have more land, although the trend shows no narrowing in
asset gaps over time. In contrast, the sex ratio does not affect years of schooling, age
differences between spouses, or differences in the resources that they bring to marriage.
South Africa. Table 10 presents regressions on years of schooling, age at mar-
riage, asset counts, and transfers made at marriage of husband and wife. Here the values
of prewedding assets and marriage transfers could not be combined because assets are
merely counted and values not imputed. Whereas in South Asia payments may come
from one’s own family, in South Africa most payments are transferred across families.
Regression results show that years of schooling, age at marriage, and assets at marriage
have been rising over time for both men and women. Across the six study countries both
schooling and age at marriage are rising for both sexes at an average rate of about 0.10
units per year (with the exception of Ethiopia where the level of education is rising at
over twice the average rate and age at marriage is falling). While time trends in educa-
tional advances in South Africa are around this average, age at marriage is rising at three
times the rate in the other countries. Observing marriage patterns before independence,
Schapera (1933, quoted in Caldwell et al. 1998) describes rising age at marriage across
southern African countries and attributes it to the suppression of polygyny by the gov-
ernment and religious authorities in combination with the need for high bridewealth
payments: older men could no longer legally take younger second and third wives, and
young men may have had to delay marriage because they had not yet accumulated suf-
ficient resources for payment of bridewealth. While this is no doubt a factor, it does not
explain the major increase in age at marriage observed in the 1980s and 1990s. The later
increase is likely the result of: (1) the opening of the economy and associated structural
adjustment and capital intensification that raised unemployment to astronomical levels;
and (2) increases in HIV prevalence and deaths due to AIDS. Both factors may delay
40
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marriage in part by reducing family resources available for marriage ceremonies and
bridewealth payments. In addition, marginal increases in the female-to-male population
sex ratio raise the value of bridewealth payments. This result was unexpected but needs to
be taken with caution given the level of aggregation of the “marriage squeeze” variable.
Parent survival to child marriage, a proxy for access to parental resources and
support, reduces age at marriage, especially for men. Parent education, particularly that
of the father, has a similar effect. These two factors may help ensure availability of
bridewealth payment, thus hastening the marriage of young men. Education of mothers
and fathers increases the education of children at marriage regardless of sex. Education
of the father increases the assets that a husband and wife bring to marriage, which may
reflect paternal earning power and hence unmeasured parental wealth. The year of mar-
riage coefficients in the marriage payment regressions are negative, indicating that more
recent marriages involve lower payments. These results are consistent with the time
trends presented in Table 2.
Table 11 presents determinants of husband–wife differences. More recent mar-
riages are characterized by lower disparities in spouse education and marriage payments
made by each family. Differences in spouse age and assets do not appear to have changed
over time. A higher female-to-male marriageable age population ratio at the time of the
wedding increases the marriage payments made by husbands. This result runs contrary
to a “scarce husband” hypothesis, and the same caveat as above applies. Being African
means that relative to his wife a man is one year older, has one less year of schooling,
brings more assets to marriage, and has a family that makes more marriage payments. In
urban areas, husband–wife asset disparities are smaller. A husband’s mother surviving
to his marriage results in a smaller spouse age difference. If a husband’s mother has
more schooling than his wife’s mother, he will be closer to his wife in age, and the
difference in the number of assets he and his wife bring to marriage will be smaller. If on
the other hand his father is more educated than his father-in-law, he will have more
assets at marriage than his wife.
Mexico. For both husband and wife, years of schooling increase with later mar-
riage years (Table 12). More years of schooling are also associated with literate parents
(both father and mother), and primary school attendance and completion by both par-
42
ents. While social status variables of the father—proxied by the father’s wearing shoes—
has a positive and significant effect on both husband’s and wife’s schooling, the corre-
sponding social status variable for the mother only affects wife’s schooling. Lastly, pa-
rental landholdings also positively influence the number of completed years of school. A
larger supply of women relative to men of marriageable age is associated with fewer years of
schooling for both men and women. The potential of increased competition for mates may
induce women to marry earlier and thus stop schooling.
Similar to the other study countries, both spouses are older in more recent mar-
riages. If the husband’s father wore shoes the husband’s age at marriage decreases. Wives
whose parents own more land tend to marry slightly later, but completion of primary
school by the father reduces wife’s age at marriage. A larger supply of women of marriage-
able age (the sex ratio) exerts downward pressure on men’s and women’s age at marriage.
Table 11 Determinants of (husband–wife) differences in years of schooling, age at
marriage, assets at marriage, and marriage payments, South Africa (OLS with robust
standard errors)
Years of Age at Count of assets Value of marriage
schooling marriage at marriage payments
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Year of marriage –0.03 –2.59 –0.02 –0.99 0.00 –0.66 –1,015.39 –4.85
Sex ratio 0.94 0.26 –4.67 –0.71 2.36 1.37 155,126.70 2.37
African race –0.98 –2.49 1.08 1.81 0.92 5.19 23,929.24 3.02
Urban 0.50 1.46 –0.76 –1.29 –0.55 –3.13 –10,446.60 –1.39
Wife’s mother alive
at wedding 0.30 0.79 –0.09 –0.13 0.20 1.26 –2,248.93 –0.38
Wife’s father alive
at wedding 0.18 0.62 0.84 1.65 0.08 0.53 9,275.94 1.86
Husband’s mother alive
at wedding 0.18 0.55 –3.65 –4.82 0.17 1.02 3,613.20 0.60
Husband’s father alive
at wedding –0.05 –0.19 –0.85 –1.85 –0.14 –1.03 –1,001.00 –0.21
Differences in:
Mother’s schooling 0.04 0.72 –0.26 –2.77 –0.08 –2.65 845.10 1.03
Father’s schooling 0.04 0.77 0.02 0.25 0.05 2.30 –769.80 –1.03
Constant 60.61 2.61 57.10 1.30 5.95 0.49 1,837,739.00 4.50
No. of observations 492 492 492 492
F-statistic 3.87 5.47 15.18 7.04
Prob >F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.12
t-statistics in bold indicate significance at 10 percent or better.
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How do time trends and parental background affect the assets brought to mar-
riage by each spouse? Land ownership by the husband at the time of marriage has de-
clined through time, possibly reflecting land scarcity and population pressure. Land
ownership by the wife, which is minimal, has not been affected by secular trends. For
both husbands and wives, parental landholdings are the most important determinants of
land ownership at marriage, although the size of the marginal effects is small. In con-
trast, over time new husbands and wives seem to be bringing more durable assets to
marriage. Husbands whose fathers have completed primary school and whose parents
wore shoes during the husband’s childhood bring more assets to the marriage. Wives
whose mothers wore shoes and whose parents owned larger land areas bring more assets
to their marriage. A larger supply of marriageable women seems to decrease the durable
assets that both spouses bring to marriage, but the reason behind this is not clear.
Turning now to differences over time, we find that schooling, age at marriage, and
land ownership differences have declined in more recent marriages (Table 13). However,
asset differences have increased. Thus it seems that while gaps in human capital at mar-
riage are decreasing, gender differences in durable asset ownership are increasing. Dif-
ferences in parent literacy and schooling (in favor of the husband) are reflected in larger
educational differences between the husband and wife. Parent landholding inequalities
contribute to age differences at marriage. None of the differences in parental background
variables are significant determinants of gender differences in asset scores. Note, how-
ever, that because our land ownership measure is only a dummy variable for whether the
husband or wife owned land at the time of marriage, this measure is more imprecise
relative to the other measures of physical and human capital. The sex ratio affects years
of schooling and asset score differences in opposite ways: a larger supply of females of
marriageable age increases the schooling gap between husbands and wives, while it re-
duces the gap between husband and wife asset scores. It is possible that, facing competi-
tion from other women, women leave school early in order to marry. As Mexico is not a
brideprice or dowry society, if most assets that couples bring to marriage are their own,
the main asset that would come from parents would be land. It is then possible that,
facing a larger supply of marriageable females, prospective grooms do not feel they need
to accumulate more assets in order to be worthy candidates in the marriage market.
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Guatemala. Levels regressions are presented in Table 14. Here age at marriage
(or, more accurately, age at first union) is increasing over time for wives but not hus-
bands. Years of schooling and assets at marriage have each increased over time for both
husbands and wives in the slums of Guatemala City. A higher female-to-male marriage-
able age population ratio at the time of the wedding decreases the assets wives bring to
marriage, perhaps because, facing competition, women who are poor migrants from the
countryside more readily enter a consensual union. Similar to Mexico, it is likely that
the assets spouses bring to marriage are their own, as brideprice and dowry are not
common, and land transfers would not be relevant to most couples as the sample is
entirely urban. Indigenous ethnicity is associated with low levels of education for both
sexes, younger marriage age for men, and fewer assets brought to marriage by women.
Family background characteristics affect the timing and the human and physical
capital brought to marriage by women. Having been raised in a rural area and migrating
to the city as an adult is associated with younger age and less education at marriage for
women. Historically, rural areas in Guatemala have been characterized by scarcity of
infrastructure and services, particularly regarding education and health (Brush et al.
2002). Having additional brothers slightly increases a woman’s marriage age, while
having additional sisters reduces the value of assets a woman brings to her marriage,
possibly because of competition for parental resources. If a woman’s mother worked for
pay (an indicator of economic need in her natal household), her marriage age and level
of education are reduced. A literate mother has opposite effects, increasing a woman’s
years of schooling and the value of assets she brings to marriage.
Spouse difference regression results are presented in Table 15. As background
data are not available for husbands, family-of-origin difference variables could not be
constructed. Therefore, two versions of the difference results are presented: one that
includes only year of marriage, sex ratio, and ethnicity, and a second that also in-
cludes levels of family background characteristics for women. In the first specifica-
tion, spouse age differences are decreasing over time, but male advantage in the value
of assets brought to marriage is rising. Indigenous ethnicity is associated with better
education of the husband relative to his wife. In the second version of the regressions
it is found that if a woman was raised in a rural area her husband will be relatively
48
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older and better educated. If her mother was a single mother, she is likely to be closer
in age to her husband. Women with more brothers bring fewer assets to marriage
relative to their husbands; those with more sisters marry men with similar education
levels to themselves. Women whose mothers worked for pay marry men who are slightly
older, while those whose mothers are literate are closer in age and educational attain-
ment to their spouses. The population sex ratio variable does not have any effect on
spouse differences.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Table 16 presents a summary of trends in schooling, age, and assets at mar-
riage, based on the regression coefficients on the year of marriage. Human capital at
marriage has been increasing for both men and women in the majority of our study
countries. In all six countries, years of schooling at marriage have increased for hus-
bands and wives.
Consistent with rising educational attainment, age at marriage is increasing for
husbands and wives in the majority of countries; that is, men and women are marrying at
later ages in more recent marriages. This upward trend can be observed for husbands in
five out of six countries. Age at marriage for men is decreasing in Ethiopia, although the
latter could reflect measurement error in the age variable. Women are also marrying at
later ages in five out of six countries. In Ethiopia, age at marriage is decreasing, possibly
reflecting both measurement error and isolation of rural villages from outside forces. In
spite of considerable political turmoil over the last decades, local traditions regarding
marriage and inheritance have remained relatively untouched, given the lack of roads
and the relative isolation of the countryside.22
There is no clear trend regarding land ownership at marriage, although grooms
seem to be bringing more physical assets to marriage in four out of six countries. In the
two countries where landholding information is not aggregated with total assets, hus-
bands’ land ownership at marriage remains constant in one case (Philippines) and de-
clines in the other (Mexico). Land ownership at marriage by women is decreasing through
time in the Philippines, and remains constant, though very low (less than 1 percent of
sample wives) in Mexico. Asset values of husbands increase through time in four coun-
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Table 16 Trends by marriage year in age, human capital, and assets at marriage
Difference
Husband Wife (Husband–Wife)
Asia
Bangladesh
Years of schooling Increasing Increasing Decreasing
Age at marriage Increasing Increasing Decreasing
Value of assets + transfers at marriage
(1996 taka) Increasing Decreasing Increasing
Philippines
Years of schooling Increasing Increasing Constant
Age at marriage Increasing Increasing Constanta
Land area at marriage Constant Decreasing Increasing
Value of nonland assets (1989 peso) Constant Constant Constant
Africa
Ethiopia
Years of schooling Increasing Increasing Increasing
Age at marriage Decreasing Decreasing Decreasing
Value of assets at marriage (1997 birr) Constant Constant Constant
South Africa
Years of schooling Increasing Increasing Decreasing
Age at marriage Increasing Increasing Constant
Count of assets at marriage Increasing Increasing Constant
Value of transfers from this family
at marriage (1998 rand) Decreasing Decreasing Decreasing
Latin America
Mexico
Years of schooling Increasing Increasing Decreasing
Age at marriage Increasing Increasing Decreasing
Owned land at marriage (1 if yes) Decreasing Constant Decreasing
Asset score Increasing Increasing Increasing
Guatemalab
Years of schooling Increasing Increasing Constant
Age at marriage Constant Increasing Decreasing
Value of assets at marriage (1999 quetzal) Increasing Increasing Increasing
a 
“Constant” implies that the t-statistic on the marriage year variable is not significant at 10 percent or better,
regardless of the magnitude of the coefficient.
b Guatemala difference results are for the first specification reported in Table 15, without female family
background variables.
tries and remain constant in Ethiopia and the Philippines. Asset values of wives increase
in three countries (Guatemala, Mexico, and South Africa), remain constant in Ethiopia
and the Philippines, and decline in Bangladesh. (In the two countries for which we have
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data on marriage payments, trends have been in opposite directions: payments are in-
creasing for husbands and decreasing for wives in Bangladesh, and decreasing for both
in South Africa.)
We now turn to how differences in human capital, age, and assets at marriage
between husband and wife have changed through time. In three out of six countries,
husband–wife gaps in schooling attainment at marriage have decreased—pointing to an
equalization of human capital at marriage. The exceptions are Guatemala and the Phil-
ippines, where the difference in years of schooling has not changed over time, and Ethio-
pia, where the difference is increasing. In the Philippines, there is no gender gap in
schooling in this generation (see Table 1), while in urban Guatemala, women are likely
to be better educated than their rural counterparts. The disturbing trend in Ethiopia is
consistent with the leveling off of enrollment rates for girls and the persistence of gen-
der gaps in education in sub-Saharan Africa, a consequence of lack of improvement in
public educational facilities and high opportunity costs of education for girls.23
In line with the closing of the education gap, in four out of six countries age
differences between husbands and wives have decreased—a move toward increasing
equality, given the possibility that seniority and experience may give husbands a bar-
gaining advantage over their wives. The two countries in which the difference in age at
marriage has not decreased are the Philippines and South Africa, the two countries where
women’s age at marriage is the highest among our study countries.
The distribution of assets at marriage continues to favor husbands. In three out of
six countries, the husband–wife asset difference has not changed through time—and
therefore continues to favor husbands—and has even increased in the two Latin Ameri-
can countries. Finally, transfers at marriage are increasingly favoring men in Bangladesh,
while the gap in transfers at marriage is decreasing in South Africa.
What do these trends imply for the distribution of power within marriage? The
reduction of husband–wife gaps in age and schooling indicates a potential improvement
in the balance of power within the family, but asset ownership continues to favor hus-
bands. These findings from our data mirror changes in investment in human capital and
asset ownership worldwide (Quisumbing and Meinzen-Dick 2001). In general, invest-
ment in women’s human capital has improved markedly in the last 25 years: Life ex-
52
pectancy has increased 20 percent faster for females than for males, fertility rates have
declined, and gaps in educational attainment have begun to close. However, gender gaps
in physical assets and resources that women can command through available legal means
continue to persist. In large part this is because of social and legal mechanisms that do
not give women equal rights to own and inherit property, particularly land (Crowley
2001; Gopal 2001). Persistent differences in assets in favor of men have important im-
plications for household well-being and the welfare of future generations, given recent
findings that increasing women’s status and control of assets has favorable effects on
child nutrition and education (Hallman 2000; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2002; Smith et
al. forthcoming).
These trends affect not only the distribution of power within marriage, but also
the role that marriage plays in the transition to adulthood. Rising education levels, par-
ticularly for women, increase the role of individual choice rather than parental choice of
a spouse or partner. Indeed, the increasing importance of personal rather than parental
characteristics in characterizing matches in the marriage market points to increased in-
dividual choice. At the same time, globalizing and modernizing economies raise the
expectations of young people beyond traditional roles. Young people delay marriage in
the hope of getting payoffs for their educational investments in the form of secure and
well-paying jobs (Caldwell et al. 1998). However, structural adjustment programs have
altered the employment structure of many developing economies; with the contraction
of the public sector there are now fewer government and other types of jobs historically
considered “good.” The transition to paid work, especially for adult males, often pre-
cedes the transition to marriage and adulthood; rising youth unemployment is associ-
ated with feelings of frustration with the inability to move on in life. If marriage marks
the transition to adulthood in most societies, this transition is being delayed, either be-
cause of the desire to stay in school or capture returns to schooling through employ-
ment, or because of the inability to find gainful employment. The impact of this delayed
transition on the institution of marriage itself deserves further investigation.
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Appendix Table 2 Determinants of age at marriage, alternative specifications with year of
birth and year of marriage (OLS with robust standard errors)
Husband’s age at marriage Wife’s age at marriage
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Bangladesh
Year of birth –0.16 –7.98 0.01 1.05
Year of marriage 0.09 4.10 0.12 10.43
Sex ratio –3.94 –1.61 –8.24 –3.46 –3.12 –1.96 –5.55 –3.20
Own birth order –0.20 –1.87 –0.03 –0.31 –0.08 –1.30 0.00 –0.01
No. of brothers –0.03 –0.22 0.19 1.36 –0.03 –0.47 –0.11 –1.31
No. of sisters –0.08 –0.56 0.12 0.91 0.12 1.40 0.16 1.80
Value of parents’ land 0.00 0.60 0.00 –2.23 0.00 –2.31 0.00 –3.07
Father’s schooling –0.24 –1.58 –0.18 –1.20 0.18 1.70 0.25 2.20
Mother’s schooling –0.15 –0.45 0.18 0.66 –0.41 –2.69 –0.23 –1.48
Site 2 1.37 2.66 0.85 1.72 0.67 2.16 0.37 1.15
Site 3 0.32 0.65 0.38 0.79 –0.11 –0.35 –0.12 –0.33
Constant –142.94 –3.41 347.72 8.58 –217.81 –9.57 –4.80 –0.19
No. of observations 779 779 786 786
F-statistic 3.09 7.59 14.54 3.87
Prob >F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.04
Philippines
Year of birth –0.10 –3.86 –0.10 –3.51
Year of marriage 0.12 3.79 0.08 2.51
Sex ratio 5.32 0.76 9.45 1.35 8.40 1.24 10.25 1.55
Father’s schooling –0.09 –0.72 0.04 0.37 –0.13 –1.12 –0.06 –0.54
Mother’s schooling –0.49 –3.03 –0.10 –0.76 –0.20 –1.32 0.11 0.76
Father’s land 0.17 2.29 0.12 1.37 0.35 2.02 0.12 0.78
Mother’s land 0.05 0.44 –0.08 –0.46 0.03 0.15 –0.13 –0.59
Village dummies
P2 dummy 0.00 0.00 –0.45 –0.34 0.70 0.63 0.04 0.03
P3 dummy 0.38 0.34 0.25 0.23 1.80 1.57 1.37 1.27
CL1 dummy –2.97 –3.10 –2.32 –2.41 –1.40 –1.43 –1.18 –1.22
CL2 dummy –3.69 –3.68 –3.18 –3.19 –1.21 –1.27 –1.18 –1.22
Constant –214.95 –3.49 210.90 4.09 –139.10 –2.26 208.16 3.73
No. of observations 259 259 259 259
F-statistic 4.50 4.50 2.88 2.87
Prob >F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.13
Ethiopia
Year of birth –0.71 –42.49 –0.66 –29.23
Year of marriage –0.34 –4.42 –0.18 –2.74
Sex ratio 53.05 2.89 173.44 26.35 51.40 3.42 170.51 23.28
Father’s schooling 1.13 0.72 0.55 0.79 0.08 0.11 0.79 1.44
Mother’s schooling 1.12 0.42 1.40 0.90 –0.01 –0.01 –0.48 –0.69
Parents’ land 0.01 4.74 0.00 0.31 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.10
No. of brothers –0.51 –3.63 –0.04 –0.52 0.01 0.10 0.13 1.78
No. of sisters –0.18 –1.00 –0.01 –0.11 –0.14 –0.99 0.06 0.74
Region (Tigray excluded)
Amhara –2.55 –2.13 0.20 0.42 –1.23 –1.19 0.36 0.73
Oromo –4.48 –4.01 –1.07 –2.48 –1.64 –1.75 –0.47 –1.07
South-Central –2.05 –1.84 0.11 0.26 –0.18 –0.20 0.49 1.10
Constant 626.59 4.88 1,163.44 46.70 305.47 2.73 1,064.71 30.12
No. of observations 554 554 554 554
F-statistic 22.7 321.1 2.37 90.77
Prob >F 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
R2 0.16 0.82 0.03 0.72
continued
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Appendix Table 2 continued
Husband’s age at marriage Wife’s age at marriage
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
South Africa
Year of birth –0.31 –7.12 –0.18 –4.35
Year of marriage 0.33 10.28 0.35 11.73
Sex ratio 0.61 0.07 21.16 1.99 8.07 0.98 26.51 2.45
African race 1.42 1.66 1.66 1.75 0.28 0.35 0.78 0.85
Urban resident –0.85 –0.97 –1.66 –1.70 –0.20 –0.25 –1.21 –1.29
Mother alive at wedding –4.50 –4.23 –3.32 –3.57 –1.85 –2.15 –2.95 –2.91
Father alive at wedding –1.63 –2.56 –2.81 –4.14 –0.66 –1.13 –1.14 –1.65
Mother any education –1.47 –2.08 0.95 1.22 –0.99 –1.35 0.68 0.89
Father any education –1.34 –1.89 0.26 0.35 –1.69 –2.45 –0.75 –1.02
Constant –624.85 –9.86 616.97 7.17 –679.10 –11.61 352.95 4.25
No. of observations 492 492 492 492
F-statistic 20.42 13.72 19.48 5.82
Prob >F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.12
Mexico
Year of birth –0.18 –37.40 –0.05 –16.52
Year of marriage 0.02 4.70 0.04 14.10
Sex ratio –3.09 –2.58 2.83 2.36 –3.94 –5.37 –1.73 –2.30
Father is literate –0.32 –1.30 0.33 1.51 0.11 0.71 0.26 1.75
Mother is literate 0.00 –0.02 0.46 2.00 –0.16 –1.21 0.00 0.02
Father has some primary schooling –0.31 –1.25 –0.04 –0.16 –0.02 –0.10 0.16 1.05
Mother has some primary schooling –0.29 –1.14 0.07 0.32 0.02 0.14 0.20 1.50
Father completed primary school 0.71 1.00 0.97 1.51 –0.50 –1.73 –0.19 –0.67
Mother completed primary school –0.89 –1.48 –0.82 –1.50 0.23 0.63 0.46 1.26
Father wore shoes –0.70 –3.24 –0.38 –1.90 –0.08 –0.61 0.06 0.46
Mother wore shoes 0.20 0.96 0.69 3.55 0.16 1.30 0.36 2.85
Parents’ landholdings 0.01 0.91 0.00 –0.26 0.03 3.44 0.02 2.40
State dummies (Guerrero excluded)
Hidalgo 1.46 5.14 0.95 3.77 0.55 3.69 0.38 2.61
Michoacan 1.04 3.54 0.07 0.26 0.65 4.10 0.22 1.44
Puebla 1.25 4.33 0.78 3.02 0.13 0.83 –0.02 –0.13
Queretaro 0.67 2.03 0.12 0.40 0.80 4.21 0.54 2.86
San Luis Potosí 2.08 7.05 0.58 2.21 0.80 5.02 0.23 1.52
Veracruz 0.74 2.75 0.39 1.64 0.08 0.57 –0.04 –0.32
Constant –15.80 –1.81 372.75 39.60 –50.46 –10.10 119.71 20.22
No. of observations 11,506 11,506 12,279 12,279
F-statistic 7 88.16 18.96 25.45
Prob >F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.01 0.17 0.03 0.04
Guatemala
Year of birth –0.41 –13.13 –0.24 –9.58
Year of marriage –0.03 –0.91 0.08 4.82
Sex ratio –7.36 –0.92 –24.05 –2.99 2.74 0.52 –12.24 –1.83
Indigenous ethnicity –1.06 –2.46 –1.04 –2.74 –0.41 –1.05 –0.40 –1.08
Rural upbringing –0.70 –2.67 –0.69 –2.86
Mother was single mother –0.54 –1.19 –0.67 –1.72
No. of brothers 0.18 2.64 0.07 1.06
No. of sisters 0.04 0.52 –0.02 –0.27
Mother worked for pay –0.46 –1.91 –0.49 –2.22
Mother literate 0.09 0.38 0.44 1.96
Constant 84.36 1.37 853.23 12.83 137.26 –4.17 498.22 9.35
No. of observations 976 976 976 976
F-statistic 2.37 63.40 5.31 13.86
Prob >F 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.01 0.43 0.04 0.20
t-statistics and F-statistics in bold indicate significance at 10 percent or better.
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Notes
1 In this paper, we use the terms “union” and “marriage” interchangeably, although
in most of the countries studied, the data refer to actual marriages. The exception
is urban Guatemala, which has a high percentage of consensual unions (40 per-
cent of unions in our sample).
2 Quisumbing directed the overall research program at IFPRI while Hallman worked
intensively on the Bangladesh and Guatemala studies. The modules on assets at
marriage were similar to those used in the Philippine study (Quisumbing 1994),
but were adapted to specific country conditions.
3 For a discussion of tests of the collective versus the unitary model of the house-
hold, see Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997; Quisumbing and Maluccio
2002; and Thomas and Chen 1994.
4 Appendix Table 2 presents estimates of the age-at-marriage regressions using
two alternative specifications: (1) year of birth and (2) year of marriage. Birth
year is consistently negative in all the regressions, which is contrary to expecta-
tions and the demographic literature on our study countries. We conclude that
measurement error is severe in the birth-year variable and thus use year at mar-
riage in our regressions.
5 As discussed previously, the IFPRI study countries were also chosen to capture
geographic and cultural variation, as well as to focus on specific policy issues
related to gender.
6 This section draws from Quisumbing and de la Brière (2000).
7 This phenomenon is also widely reported in India. See Rao (1997) and Bloch and
Rao (2002).
8 Respondents were predominantly male. Wives usually answered the fertility and
child schooling questions, and questions on proposed bequests were answered
jointly by husband and wife.
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9 Nonland assets are valued in 1989 pesos. Present values were used for assets
whose present values were declared by the respondents. Asset values for which
only values at bestowal were available were inflated to 1989 values using the
farm-gate rice price index for farm animals, farm assets, and on-farm residential
house and lot; or a region-specific consumer price index (CPI) for readily trade-
able consumer durables. Because mobility and fungibility of farm assets is lim-
ited, and the value of farm property is linked to returns to rice production, the
farm-gate rice price index may be a better adjustment factor than the CPI.
10 The 1997 ERHS was undertaken by the Department of Economics, Addis Ababa
University (AAU), in collaboration with IFPRI and the Centre for the Study of
African Economies (CSAE), Oxford University. The survey built on a panel sur-
vey conducted by AAU and CSAE in 1994/95, but the information collected in
these earlier rounds is not used in the present analysis.
11 The number of observations varies across regressions because of missing infor-
mation for some unions. We chose to use the greatest number of valid observa-
tions to preserve sample size. For a more thorough analysis of marriage patterns
in Ethiopia, see Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2003a, 2003b).
12 Before the 1980s in rural Ethiopia, people lived on their own land and in most
cases households were scattered. Under such conditions, the government felt that
it was very difficult to provide social services such as schooling, health facilities,
and so forth to rural households, so it embarked on the villagization program in
the 1980s, which involved relocating scattered households to selected locations
to form villages. The number of households in each village could vary from loca-
tion to location. The program was not voluntary at all. Families were forced to
abandon their homes and move to selected locations for village formation and
build their houses according to the design provided by the government (Yisehac
Yohannes, personal communication, 13 November 2003).
13 The first South African national household survey, the Project for Statistics on
Living Standards and Development (PSLSD), was undertaken in the last half of
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1993 (PSLSD 1994). KwaZulu-Natal Province, on the east coast, was resurveyed
in March–June 1998 for KIDS (May et al. 2000).
14 Patricia Muñiz, Ana Núñez, and Gabriela Vázquez were instrumental in design-
ing and fielding the pilot survey among the promotoras.
15 Note also that because this module was administered in the third round of the
evaluation surveys, sample attrition implies that we do not have this information
for all households originally included in the baseline. Because we wanted to ex-
amine the effects of bargaining power variables on outcomes over time, and since
we are interested in the bargaining power of husband and wife, the analysis in
this paper is restricted to intact couples who were interviewed in all three survey
rounds (ENCEL 98O, 98M, and 99M).
16 The assets included in the asset score were: blender, gas stove, traditional stove,
television set, jewelry, clock, agricultural equipment, chicken, pig, goat, and cow.
17 The asset score of Morris et al. (1999) is slightly different: the weight is multi-
plied by the number of the units of asset g owned by the household rather than the
indicator that the household owns the asset. We used the indicator because the
survey module did not ask how many of the assets each spouse owned, but only
whether or not they owned at least one of each item. We also multiply our asset
score by 100.
18 See Ruel et al. (2002) for a more detailed description of the study and Hallman et
al. (2002) for a related paper on women’s work and childcare arrangements.
19 The value of premarital assets and transfers received at the time of marriage are
aggregated here because in South Asia they may constitute the same types of
goods and because marriage transfer payments often come not only from the
spouse’s family but from one’s own family as well (see for instance Edlund 1997,
2000; Gardner 1995). In an earlier version of the paper with regressions for pre-
marital assets and transfers run separately, it was found that premarital asset hold-
ings of men rise with later marriage dates while women’s show no change over
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time; on the other hand marriage transfer payments to men increase with time,
while transfers to women fall over time—a confirmation of the trend toward
dowry payments found in the literature cited above.
20 According to the National Family Fertility Survey, the mean age of women who
married before 1966 was 14.9 years, compared to 15.5 years for those who mar-
ried in 1966–70, 15.8 years for those who married in 1971–75, and 17.1 years for
those who married after 1976.
21 Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2003b), using a different specification, find that the
value of grooms’ assets at marriage does not increase through time, but for first
marriages, the value of brides’ assets at marriage posts a secular increase. There is
no secular trend in the value of brides’ assets at marriage for subsequent marriages.
22 This is not to say that local traditions have not changed at all—they have, espe-
cially in areas influenced by urbanization and labor migration. In our opinion,
however, they have changed much less than in African countries previously colo-
nized by Europeans.
23 Although the gender gap in schooling worldwide has decreased over time, girls’
primary school enrollment rates have leveled off in sub-Saharan Africa at around
54 percent. Absolute levels of female enrollment and schooling remain lower in
sub-Saharan Africa than in other developing regions, with female secondary school
enrollment rates of 14 percent in 1995 (World Bank 2001).
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